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ABSTRACT
Legal change, whether through legislation, regulation, or court decision, is a common phenomenon,
and virtually all reform creates both gains and losses for those who under the prior regime took
actions that would have lasting effects.  This article offers a conceptual framework for assessing the
desirability of different transition policies, ranging from compensation of losses and taxation of
gains, grandfathering of pre-enactment investments, and delayed or partial implementation to
complete and immediate implementation or even retroactive application.  Emphasis is placed on how
transitions and various mitigation strategies affect the incentives of and risk borne by private actors
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I.  Introduction
The costs and benefits of many actions depend on future events, including the legal
regime that will subsequently be in force.  Accordingly, the prospect of legal transitions –
changes in governing rules – is relevant to most significant decisions that individuals and entities
make.
When new government policies are implemented, they may be fully applied from that
point forward to preexisting investments, retroactively extended to the past, or made applicable
only to subsequent activity.  And a variety of transition provisions can be implemented,
including partial or full compensation of losses and taxation of gains, grandfathering, phase-ins,
and so forth.  Hence, with regard to the myriad government actions involving changes in
legislation, regulation, the common law, government spending priorities, and other practices,
there is always the question of what transition scheme should be employed.
This article offers a conceptual framework for analyzing transition policy.  Rather than
advocating particular transition rules in general or in specific contexts, it seeks to emphasize
certain factors that need to be considered in most settings and, in many instances, to suggest how
some of the analysis should be undertaken.
1
Especially important but often slighted is the need to be explicit and consistent (and,
ultimately, realistic) about one’s assumptions, notably, assumptions concerning government
behavior.  This concerns both assumptions about how substantive policy decisions are made by
government actors – legislatures, agencies, and courts – and also assumptions about transition
policy itself, such as whether it is known by private parties in advance and will be followed
consistently in the future.  Sometimes it is helpful to make various stipulations about government
behavior and determine optimal transition policy accordingly; this has been the approach in
much of the literature, although not all authors make the same assumptions, the assumptions are
not always explicit, and they may not be maintained consistently in subsequent analysis.  In
addition, it is important to analyze directly the question of how government is in fact likely to
behave under various circumstances.
The investigation here will proceed as follows.  Section II elaborates on the scope of the
transition question, explaining a number of respects in which the problem is more pervasive than
may seem apparent and emphasizing the often-overlooked symmetry of transition losses and
transition gains.  Section III comments briefly on the criteria that should be used in assessing
transition policy.  Section IV, echoing the foregoing remarks, emphasizes certain assumptions
and distinctions that are important to keep in mind.  Section V focuses on private actors, in
particular, on how the prospect of transitions – and various forms of transition mitigation – affect
incentives and risk-bearing.  Section VI examines government behavior, regarding both2I first articulated and more fully elaborated the view that transition issues should be
viewed as a general problem arising from uncertainty concerning future government action in
Kaplow (1986, section 1; 1987, section 1.1).
3See, for example, the representative citations in Kaplow (1986, p. 515 & n.3).
4For earlier discussions of the breadth of the problem, see, for example, Hale (1927) and
Samuels (1974).
5It should be noted that change per se is irrelevant.  Consider the case in which existing
law provides for different treatment in future years but this treatment is known ex ante with
certainty.  Then there is no transition gain or loss in the sense meant here (even though the
pattern of change may itself result from a prior transition, such as a phased-in reform).  One can
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transition policy and underlying substantive policy, including possible effects of the former on
the latter.  Section VII considers some applications, solely for purposes of illustrating how the
analysis can be made more concrete.  Section VIII offers concluding remarks.
It should be emphasized that the present discussion will often be rather compressed,
referring the reader to prior work for clarification or leaving questions open for subsequent
investigation.  The reason is that this article aims to focus on the framework itself rather than on
the analysis and resolution of transition issues in particular fields, such as taxation and takings,
as in most of the pertinent literature.  In addition, the analysis here is limited in a number of
respects, largely ignoring problems of implementation, legal and other institutional constraints
regarding transition policy, and various other matters.
II.  Scope of Question
It is useful to define the transition question as arising whenever actors make decisions
whose effects may be influenced by government policies that are not known with certainty at the
time the decisions are made.  To elaborate, consider three respects in which this definition is
broad.
2
A.  Not Merely Nominally Retroactive Government Action
Although most legal theorists had traditionally expressed concern only about explicitly
(nominally) retroactive law – that is, new law that changed the legal status of prior actions
3 – it
has for some time been apparent that the subject is much broader.  Graetz (1977, pp. 49-50, 57-
58) drove this point home in his analysis of tax reform.
4  Consider, for example, an investment
that pays off evenly over a thirty-year period.  If a tax rule changes after the first year and is
nominally prospective – applicable only to subsequent years – it is still the case that the
remaining twenty-nine years of investment return will be affected; that the first year’s return is
exempt from the reform because the reform is not nominally retroactive is a modest detail from
the investor’s perspective.
Generalizing from this example, a transition issue will be said to arise whenever an act
has future consequences and the legal regime applicable to those future consequences is not
known with certainty at the outset.
5  Because the legal world is in fact uncertain, and in somealso consider a different sort of case, one with no actual change but with transition effects:
Whenever there is a change in the probability of future reform, the value of an investment may
rise or fall (including, for example, in the case in which a reform that previously had a nontrivial
probability of enactment is no longer under consideration).
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realms change is quite frequent, and moreover many actions have important future effects, the
present consideration suggests that the transition phenomenon is quite far-reaching.
Explicit retroactivity should also be considered.  It is possible – and, as will be explored,
may sometimes be optimal – for new legal rules to apply to conduct entirely in the past.  Hence,
both acts whose effects are entirely instantaneous and those whose effects have fully transpired
might be subject to subsequent reform.  For example, actors may later be made to make
payments on account of their prior disposal of materials now deemed to be hazardous.
B.  Range of Government Policy
Transition issues are most commonly discussed by legal academics in the field of
taxation and, to a lesser degree, tort liability.  Explicit retroactivity is also considered by criminal
law scholars.  Although often classified as a separate problem, the subject is also addressed with
regard to government takings.  Additional areas include all types of regulation and deregulation,
tariff and other trade policy, and government spending (whether through government contracting
or otherwise).  Indeed, it is difficult to think of government activity that does not present
transition issues.
To illustrate the breadth of the subject, consider a particular investment decision: the
choice of whether to go to medical school to develop one’s human capital.  The return to this
investment may depend, among other things, on future tax policies, state regulation of the
medical profession, federal legislation on health insurance, Medicare spending and
reimbursement policies, expenditures on biomedical research, regulation of the pharmaceutical
industry (including patent policy), rules on immigration of individuals with medical training, and
legislative as well as court activity regarding medical malpractice liability.  Even ignoring rules
directly related to whether and how a medical school graduate may practice medicine, a vast
array of government policies will influence the outcome of a decision to become a doctor.
Obviously, prevailing practice concerning transition mitigation varies widely: Takings
are to be fully compensated, new tax rules are often nominally prospective, common law rules
(such as in the area of tort liability) are generally deemed to be found rather than newly created
and hence are generally applicable to past behavior, and parties affected by changes in
government spending priorities are generally left bearing their gains or losses, unless some group
successfully lobbies for different treatment.
This variance in policy with regard to similar phenomena itself suggests the need for
investigation.  In arguing that similar transition issues arise in virtually all areas of government
policy, it is not being suggested that the optimal transition policy is the same in each instance –
although it is probably worth entertaining a weak presumption that transition policies should be6When I first emphasized the need to consider gains and analyze them symmetrically –
Kaplow (1986, subsection II.C.2; 1987, subsection 2.3.2); see also Kaplow (1991a, p. 173;
1992a, pp. 533-34) – most analyses in various areas considered only losses.  Fortunately, it is
now more common – though still hardly widespread – to examine gains as well, although authors
do not always consistently apply whatever framework is used to analyze losses.  See, for
example, Bell and Parchomovsky (2001b).
7In Kaplow (1986, p. 556), I suggested (with qualifications, see n.134) that revenue
effects may provide an efficiency basis for distinguishing gains and losses.  However, in Kaplow
(1987, section 2.3.2), I offered a more complete and qualified view, one reinforced by
subsequent, largely unrelated work.  See Kaplow (1996) and also the qualifications to that
analysis in Ng (2000) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2001).  Nevertheless, asymmetric revenue
effects may sometimes be important for political reasons.
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the same in the absence of identifying good reasons that justify differences.  Rather, the claim is
that for analytical purposes it is useful to recognize that these seemingly different contexts raise
many common questions and that some of the answers – notably those concerning how private
actors are affected in terms of incentives and risk – may be the same.  Furthermore, because most
writing on transition policy is confined to particular fields, such as tax reform or takings, there
are significant potential gains from cross-fertilization if the commonality of issues is better
recognized.
C.  Symmetry of Gains and Losses
As I have emphasized in all my prior writing on the subject, it is important to understand
that transition gains are as ubiquitous as transition losses and to a substantial extent call for
symmetric analysis.
6  Regarding the effects themselves, just as a tax increase (through changing
rates, exemptions, and other rules) may disadvantage one investment, a tax decrease may
advantage another; regulations may impose both benefits and costs, and in either case,
deregulation may have opposite effects; also, laws that help or hurt one firm may have opposite
effects on competitors.
Furthermore, there is a strong prima facie case for analyzing these symmetric phenomena
in a similar manner.  In formal economic analysis, the equations would often be identical, and
certain variables can simply take on positive or negative values.  Regarding incentives, both
gains and losses tend to have analogous effects.  For risk, what matters is the distribution of
possible returns and their corresponding probabilities; which outcome is designated the status
quo is unimportant for most purposes, and although gains and losses of a given magnitude can
have a different impact, the analysis is nevertheless similar.  Government agents that ignore
losses because they do not personally bear them may similarly ignore gains, and if concentrated
losses are more likely to generate organized lobbying, so are concentrated gains.
It is not insisted that gains and losses may never require different analysis or different
transition policies.  But there does seem to be a strong basis for considering gains and losses
together, and it seems that the correct treatment would often be similar.
78For a defense of welfarism, with extensive citation to and discussion of competing
views, see Kaplow and Shavell (2002).
9In principle, the distribution of income is also relevant.  In the transition setting,
however, most issues that might loosely be described as distributive really involve questions of
risk-bearing, given the ex ante nature of the analysis.  As subsection IV.B.1 indicates, these
effects will be distinguished from intentional redistribution, such as when tax rates are changed
to adjust the tax burdens of different income classes.
It is also possible that individuals have tastes for government relief, in the sense that they
feel bad if the government, say, takes someone’s home and offers no compensation.  (In a world
with no compensation requirement, and in which private insurance markets were accordingly
more developed, it is not clear how strong such feelings would be.)  In such instances, this factor
would be relevant under welfarism, to an extent determined by the strength, assessed
empirically, of individuals’ actual tastes and how they were affected by various government
transition policies.
10Of course, these other notions might be invoked as independent evaluative principles,
taken to be important in themselves, as explored in section B.  Alternatively, they might be used
as tests or rules of thumb, for example, by courts (think of takings doctrine), who either find
them useful or feel bound to apply them due to the prevailing understanding of legal constraints. 
These latter uses could, in theory, be justified; whether existing practice in this regard is actually
warranted is not considered here.
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Despite this symmetry, I will often focus on the case of transition losses and transition
relief for simplicity and due to readers’ expectations.  Nevertheless, with rare exception all
analysis herein should be interpreted as applicable to gains as well as to losses and relief should
usually be interpreted to include mitigation of gains.  (Thus references to compensation should
usually be understood to encompass taxation of gains; grandfathering and other transition
mechanisms tend automatically to provide symmetric treatment of gains and losses.)
III.  Criteria for Assessment of Transition Policy
A.  Welfare
The analysis in following sections will take the objective to be the advancement of
individuals’ well-being.  This objective is controversial in the legal academy, including with
regard to transition policy, but it will not be explicitly defended here due to space constraints and
the existence of other work on the subject.
8
In the present context, a welfarist view will generally imply that attention should be
focused on the efficiency of behavioral effects and risk-bearing costs.
9  It is important to examine
these effects explicitly rather than relying on vague criteria such as encouraging investment,
protecting expectations, and so forth.  Some of these other, commonly invoked criteria may well
serve as proxies for the advancement of welfare, but analysis based on such intermediate
principles can be misleading.
10  This is especially so with a subject like that involving transitions,
where the analysis is often subtle and the matter itself involves a sort of meta-problem.11See especially Kaplow (1986, sections II.A.1, II.D.1, and III.B).  (Among other points,
it is suggested, see id. p. 579-80 n.206, that many of these other criteria might be proxies for
welfarist objectives that are mistakenly taken to be first principles as a consequence of
overgeneralization.)  Interestingly, most of these theories are invoked to justify relief for
transition losses, while little is said of the implication for mitigation of transition gains, such as
through taxation.
To the extent that nonwelfarist criteria are to be defended as independent evaluative
principles in the transition setting, they would be subject to the analysis in Kaplow and Shavell
(2002).  In particular, proponents ought to be able to state the relevant principles with some
clarity, offer explicit rationales – including reasons that the principles should be pursued at the
expense of (possibly everyone’s) well-being – and address alternative, welfarist explanations for
the intuitions underlying proposed nonwelfarist principles.
12Fisch (1997) argues that individuals should be protected when law previously in
“equilibrium” (that is, long settled law that appears to have a very low probability of changing)
is reformed.  Of course, there would be practical problems in identifying such laws; furthermore,
the fact that legal change is never instantaneous, so that the very low initial probability would
first rise – making her principle then seem inapplicable – before reform actually occurs.  More
relevant for present purposes, however, the normative basis for protecting such reliance is
unclear, especially if in fact the prevailing norm were, as discussed in the text to follow, that no
protection was available in such cases.
13For further discussion of the point, see section VII.E, discussing the aptness and
implications of the analogy between changes in the law and breach of contract.
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B.  Other Criteria
This section notes a number of other criteria often invoked in the transition context and
briefly indicates why they are deficient.  More complete analysis appears elsewhere.
11
1.  Reliance and expectations. – Although commonplace in most transition settings, it is
increasingly recognized that arguments based on actors’ reliance on and expectations concerning
existing law are circular and otherwise deficient.  As a matter of fact, law often changes, in some
areas (notably tax) at a breathtaking rate, and actors are aware of this.
12  Moreover, in principle,
the very existence of legislatures, regulators, and courts with lawmaking authority belies the
notion that there is some sort of legal entitlement that law will not change.
13  Furthermore,
arguments both for and against transition relief tend to be circular: If no relief is the norm, one
cannot reasonably expect relief to be forthcoming, but if relief is the norm, it can indeed be
expected; hence, in determining what, if any, relief should ordinarily be provided, expectations
cannot provide the answer.  Answering this normative question requires offering reasons, which
actors’ predictions about the future under any particular existing regime do not provide.
2.  Government as cause of harm. – In some settings, such as takings, it may be suggested
that the government should compensate losers because it has caused them harm, following
principles analogous to those of corrective justice in the tort context.  But the analogy is just that:
The government is a qualitatively different type of actor from a private party, so it is not obvious14See also Fischel and Sykes (1999).  The strength of the analogy depends on whether the
analysis of government behavior, see section VI, may differ from that of private actors;
obviously, it can, even if in some settings it turns out that it does not.  Thus, the analogy can be
seen as a proxy, encouraging the analyst to consider the question of government behavior, but
not as much of a guide to analysis and certainly not as an independent evaluative principle.
15For a review and critique of the corrective justice literature, see Kaplow and Shavell
(2002, ch. III).
16See also Kaplow (1989), developing the idea in the context of arguments phrased in
terms of horizontal equity.
17See, for example, Auerbach and Hassett (2001), Feldstein (1976), King (1983), and
Musgrave (1990).
18See Kaplow (1989, 1995b, 2001); see also Westen (1982).  For a defense, see Musgrave
(1990).
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that the analogy holds, as will be explored further in section VI.
14  Furthermore, theories of
corrective justice are arguably inapplicable (because they require the injurer to have acted
wrongfully), and in any event they do not really provide a normative basis for requiring
compensation (much less for determining when compensation is warranted).
15
3.  Fair distribution of benefits and burdens of government. – Another suggestion is that
transition relief is justified in order that certain individuals do not shoulder an unfair share of the
burdens of government.  Such theories are often question-begging, in that they may have
difficulty specifying the baseline for determining what counts as an unfair burden.  It is also the
case that, from an ex ante perspective, such matters can be more fully, precisely, and
appropriately analyzed in a welfarist framework as problems concerning the imposition of risk,
as will be seen in section V.A.
16
4.  Horizontal equity. – The concept of horizontal equity is most commonly invoked in
the tax setting, often by economists.
17  The principle, which requires equal treatment of equals,
may have similar implications to the foregoing concern with fair distribution (which similarly
objects on inequality in the bearing of burdens of government action).  In addition, transitions
can have arbitrary effects that seem to violate horizontal equity, because similarly situated
individuals may have taken what were materially equivalent actions ex ante that, due to
subsequent changes in government policy, ultimately have different effects (for example,
investments in activities that prior to a reform had identical after-tax returns but no longer do
afterwards).  Once again, however, the problem is better understood in welfarist terms when
analyzing risk-bearing costs.  As an independent principle, horizontal equity is deeply
problematic.
18
IV.  Assumptions and Distinctions
A.  Assumptions Concerning Government Behavior
As emphasized in the introduction, it is quite important in attempting to determine
optimal transition policy to be clear and consistent about one’s assumptions, particularly those19In my prior work, I have been quite explicit about how certain parts of my analysis
depended on such assumptions – see, for example, Kaplow (1986, pp. 520-21, introducing the
analysis of risk and incentives; section III.A, relaxing one of the assumptions; pp. 616-17,
reemphasizing the role of assumptions in the conclusion) – although my work is not always thus
interpreted.
20For some analysis of them, see Kaplow (1986, section II.C.3; 1987, section 4.6). 
Regarding the most important of these questions in the long run, the commitment problem, two
sorts of approaches are available.  One involves formal institutional arrangements such as the use
of constitutional requirements (for example, the requirement of compensation for takings) or
other strategies taking advantage of the separation of powers (a legislature might impose a
transition policy on an agency).  Another relies more directly on the development of norms,
deviation from which is understood to be improper (for example, arbitrary confiscation is widely
thought to be illegitimate independent of specific constitutional constraints).  For skepticism
about the possibility of establishing such norms in the tax context, see Stark (1996).
By contrast, case-by-case transition policy is problematic, primarily because of the
importance of ex ante incentive effects but also because it invites costly rent seeking and it may
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concerning government behavior.
19  For much of the analysis here, especially in section V,
certain assumptions will be made in this regard.  These assumptions, it should be noted, are not
offered because of a belief about their realism in any particular transition context; rather, they are
made merely to focus the inquiry into a problem that is reasonably complex even when a number
of factors are set aside.  Indeed, most of the discussion in section VI will be concerned with how
relaxing the second assumption may affect the analysis.
1.  Transition policy. – In considering what transition policy would be optimal, it is
useful to assume that a transition policy under consideration is both known by all concerned ex
ante, at the time various investment decisions are made, and will be implemented ex post. 
Although subsequent analysis will suggest that often it may be desirable for individuals all to act
ex ante as if they expect one policy but then to implement a different policy – just as it may be
optimal to have a firm policy of no disaster relief to induce individuals to take appropriate
precautions but then to bail out those whose uncontrollable imprudence leads them to folly –
such an approach is not sustainable over time.  A government that consistently delivers X despite
promising Y will ultimately be expected to deliver X; the promises about Y will eventually be
ignored.  Thus, if the question is what transition policy would be best in the long run, it is
insufficient, indeed, misleading, to ask what transition policy has the best effects taking behavior
as given.  Instead, one should determine the ex ante effects of a fully anticipated transition
policy.
This assumption, although most appropriate for normative analysis, does raise further
questions.  Notably, how should one implement – that is, make the transition to – the optimal
transition policy?  What if a major reform is presently under consideration but there is no clear
understanding of what transition policy would accompany it if enacted?  And how does a
government that has chosen an optimal transition policy avoid the temptation to deviate from it
when enacting particular reforms?  These important issues are beyond the scope of the present
investigation.
20involve inferior risk mitigation (due to uncertainty about the extent of mitigation that will
ultimately be provided by the government).
21In considering political reality, it may be noted that the present assumption that the
reforms themselves are desirable will have some tendency to correspond to the perceptions of the
relevant government actors.  For example, a legislature is unlikely to be inclined to adopt
transition rules that undermine the very policy it seeks to implement (although transition rules
may be imposed as a constraint, such as when they are constitutionally required or when strong
norms or procedures favor particular approaches).
22For example, a reform that was only moderately desirable if implemented optimally
might be undesirable if required to be implemented under a sufficiently poor transition regime.
Transition policy may also influence optimal policy indirectly because transition policy
influences ex ante investments, which in turn may influence what substantive policy is optimal
ex post.  Blume and Rubinfeld (1984, pp. 622-23) discuss this problem with regard to takings: In
the absence of a requirement of compensation, investors might have incentives to overbuild
(rather than the ordinary incentive to build less, as discussed in section V) because it will be
optimal for the government to take parcels that are relatively less developed.  But this argument
is incomplete.  Most obviously, overbuilding is a two-edged sword since, if the parcel is taken in
any event, one loses even more.  Furthermore, takings are usually employed to assemble large
blocks of land, such as for rights of way, so it seems unlikely that an individual investor building
more on a single plot would affect the project decision, though perhaps a slightly different route
might be chosen.  See Kaplow (1986, p. 568 n.168).  Even more so, other government regulation
tends to apply to classes of activity rather than to that of a single individual.  (For another
instance in which compensation for takings may affect ex ante investments in a manner that
influences the desirability of takings, see note 95 on the case of endangered species
preservation.)
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2.  Underlying substantive policy. – In much of the analysis, notably, in section V, it will
be assumed that underlying substantive government policy, including reforms thereof, is
optimally determined.  This assumption is important because, as will be seen, whether the
incentive effects of various transition policies are beneficial or detrimental will sometimes
depend on the desirability of the underlying reform.  This is because transition mitigation tends
to reduce the impact of new policies.  When new policies are efficient, this effect of transition
mitigation tends to be inefficient.  Likewise, when reform is undesirable, transition relief that
tends to undermine the effects of reform is beneficial.  Consider, for example, delayed
implementation, a common form of transition relief; an infinite delay would be ideal if the
reform itself were deleterious, but such a delay would be absurd if the reform were valuable.
21
In addition, it will provisionally be assumed that transition policy does not affect what
substantive policy will be chosen.  To an extent, this is a corollary of the preceding assumption,
for a government actor presumed to make optimal decisions regarding reforms would not
generally be influenced by the transition regime, although such influences are clearly possible.
22 
As will be explored in section VI, however, it is entirely possible that the transition policy that
governments will have to follow may affect which underlying substantive reforms are
implemented.23See Kaplow (1986, p. 519 & n.20, pp. 579-80; 1987, section 4.9); Samuels (1974).  The
distinction is less clear when a transition or proposed transition mitigation has a systematic
distributive effect.  However, it is generally better to address concerns about the income
distribution through the rate structure of the income tax, transfer programs, and the like rather
than skewing other policies on account of their distributive effects.  See, for example, Kaplow
and Shavell (1994).
24It should be apparent that incidental and intentional distributive effects are not self-
defining natural categories but rather depend upon the purposes of reforms and one’s underlying
objectives, particularly distributive objectives.
25See Kaplow (1986, subsection IV.C.3.b; 1987, subsection V.4.1).  See also Shaviro
(2000, pp. 53-62) (describing this distinction as one between “policy change retroactive taxes”
and “accounting change retroactive taxes”).  As discussed in section VII.D, this issue has most
frequently been addressed in connection with the transition from an income tax to a consumption
tax.
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B.  Distinctions Among Types of Reforms and Effects
Although section II emphasizes that there are important similarities among a variety of
transition contexts, the problem is sufficiently broad and the types of government policies are
sufficiently diverse that one can hardly expect the analysis to be the same in every instance. 
Here, a number of important distinctions are noted.  Others will emerge throughout the rest of
the analysis and in the applications, but even then the list will not be exhaustive.
1.  Incidental versus intentional redistribution.
23 – Transition policy is generally
understood to concern gains and losses that are incidental to the underlying substantive reform
rather than its object.  For example, investors whose portfolios are disproportionately allocated
to health sector stocks may be winners or losers when health policy is reformed, but this is
unlikely to be the (or an) object of the reform.  Thus, it is conceivable that one would favor the
reform and yet support taxation of the winners or compensation of the losers.  By contrast, a tax
increase focused on the rich, designed to increase the extent of redistribution, is by design one
that makes rich taxpayers losers.  The notion that these losers should be compensated for their
losses would be nonsensical, given the purposes of the reform.
24
2.  Accounting changes versus intended incentive effects.
25 – One might raise or lower a
tax, subsidy, or fine on a given activity in order to influence its extent, such as when taxing
polluting activities or subsidizing expenditures on research and development.  But there also can
be mere accounting or other technical changes which, if unaccompanied by relief, can have
powerful unintended effects.  Suppose, for example, that taxation is to be changed from a fiscal
year of July 1 to June 30 to a calendar year basis.  If the change is made effective immediately,
then there will be a six-month period of activity that either will be double taxed (counted as part
of a year under both the old and new systems) or effectively exempt from taxation (being
excluded from the final year under the old system and not included under the first year under the
new system).  Such an effect is unlikely to be intended and, if anticipated, can have huge
incentive effects: The prospect of double taxation would tend to move significant economic
activity out of the pertinent six-month period, whereas the prospect of exemption would cause26See Kaplow (1986, p. 598 n.275; 2000, p. 518).
27This section draws on the more extensive informal discussion in Kaplow (1986) and the
formal analysis in Kaplow (1987, 1991a, 1992a).  In addition to more through discussions and
consideration of a broader array of factors, references to the pertinent literature on insurance and
other matters can be found therein.  For subsequent work in a similar spirit, see Shaviro (2000,
ch. 3).
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much activity to be transferred into that period.  Various adjustments (such as running the old or
new regime with a six-month transition “year”) could avoid such effects entirely.
3.  Rules that regulate behavior versus default rules.
26 – When discussing legal rules,
most analysts have in mind rules that are binding, or at least that subject violators to fines or fees
that are not optional.  Yet important bodies of law, especially contract law (and related areas,
such as aspects of commercial and corporate law), serve primarily to provide default rules, the
purpose of which is to save parties the expense of making extensive provisions in their contracts
and to save parties and adjudicators dispute resolution costs when no express provision has been
made.  Reform of default rules may well reflect new information as to which practices most
parties would prefer rather than an attempt to reward or punish particular behavior.
In such cases, determining appropriate transition rules reflects different concerns from
those to be examined in sections V and VI.  On one hand, retroactive application may seem
appropriate, if the default rule is seen as a guess – the best guess – of what most parties would
have wanted to govern their affairs.  On the other hand, prospective application is favored by the
fact that parties for whom the prevailing default rule was substantially undesirable may have
contracted around it, whereas parties would not have undertaken the expense to contract around
default rules not yet in existence.  Of course, legal change always may be anticipated, but with
regard to default rules, where a significant purpose is to save parties the expense of providing for
various unlikely contingencies, the possibility of anticipation may be of little consolation.  These
considerations also suggest that it may well not be optimal to change default rules very
frequently, perhaps allowing less-than-ideal but not terribly inefficient default rules to remain on
the books because parties are used to them and have adjusted their contracting practices
accordingly.
V.  Private Actors: Incentives and Risk
This section examines how various forms of transition relief affect the efficiency of
private actors’ behavior and the risk that they bear.
27  The main analysis is presented in section
A, which assumes that underlying government policy is optimal and unaffected by the form of
transition relief (as does the remainder of section V), that moral hazard is the only relevant
market imperfection, and that relief is in the form of compensation for losses and taxation for
gains.  Section B considers additional market imperfections, and section C discusses the
similarities and differences among different forms of transition relief.28In addition to my own work, which presents extensive analysis of private actors’ risk
and incentives based on the analogy between government and market risks, others have
suggested the relevance of the analogy.  See, for example, Graetz (1977, pp. 65-66), Hale (1927,
pp. 528-29), Michelman (1967, pp. 1216-17), and Samuels (1974, pp. 113, 118, 124).
29See Kaplow (1991a) and also Arnott and Stiglitz (1991).
30Accordingly, many of the market imperfections discussed in section B will be irrelevant
because they are inapplicable to risk mitigation through broad ownership.  Another point is that
some entities – like nonprofit organizations and lower-level units of government – are in this
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A.  Basic Analysis
1.  Analogy between government-created risk and risk due to market or natural forces.
28
– In the present setting, where the focus is on private actors and government substantive policy is
taken to be optimal, government-created risk and risk due to market or natural forces, as well as
government mitigation of such risk, are almost precisely analogous.  To private parties, gains are
gains, losses are losses, and taxation and compensation of gains and losses have the same cost or
benefit regardless of the original source of the effects being mitigated.  Likewise, market relief
for risk – whether through explicit insurance arrangements or implicitly, such as through
diversified financial ownership – is in principle equally effective regardless the source of the
risk.
Because of the analogy between government risk and that due to market or natural forces,
it is possible to analyze the transition problem by first examining the more familiar and
straightforward problem of whether the government should provide relief for natural disasters, as
is done in subsection 2, and then in subsection 3 to explain more fully how that analysis applies
with regard to transition policy.
2.  Illustration of inefficiency of government relief using natural disaster analogy.
29 
(a)  Incentive effects. – To see the implications of government relief in a simple, clear, and
familiar setting, consider relief for natural disasters, such as flooding.  The prospect of floods –
say, due to the periodic overflow of rivers or coastal storms – should lead actors to invest less
than they otherwise would in areas prone to flooding because of the probability that their
investments will be damaged or destroyed.  And, in the absence of the prospect of compensation
or other relief, they will be led to do so in a manner that tends to be efficient: The greater the risk
of loss, the less they will invest.  On the other hand, to the extent that losses will be compensated
by the government, actors will not bear all of their losses (but will continue to reap the gains
when there is no flood), creating an externality of sorts.  Hence, they will overinvest.
(b)  Risk, incentives, and market versus government mitigation of risk. – If it is efficient
ever to invest in such regions, as it surely is in many cases, actors will bear risk.  Some actors,
such as large entities with dispersed ownership, will be approximately risk neutral.  (It is difficult
to overemphasize the importance of this point, for many government policies, ranging from large
portions of the fields of taxation and regulation to trade policy, have a substantial portion of their
effects on large corporations.
30)  Others, notably individuals, will be risk averse.respect similar to diversified firms.
31In the present setting, moral hazard is easy to combat directly because it involves a
larger investment that both is easily observable and will only be insured if the individual seeks
greater coverage.  More subtle moral hazard problems, such as with property insurance, can
often be dealt with in part through inspections (for smoke detectors or fireproof doors) and
through policy exclusions (such as policies that cover rain damage to the interior of a building
only if a storm broke through windows or walls but not if windows were left open).  In other
instances, such as the following illustration in the text involving product hazards, an insurer may
have difficulty assessing an insured’s efforts to reduce risks.
32See the previous footnote.  In addition, when not all relevant behavior can be observed
(perhaps the size of a building can be observed but not all aspects of construction or operation
that influence the extent of losses in a flood), there is another, more subtle way that moral hazard
can be avoided: by making coverage dependent on the state of nature rather than on the extent of
actual loss.  For example, compensation might be made a function of how high the water rises. 
Individuals would then have an incentive to take full precautions because, at the margin, any
reduction in their actual losses does not reduce their insurance payment.
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In the absence of government relief, risk-averse actors will be inclined to buy insurance. 
Insurance, however, can create adverse incentives – referred to as moral hazard – because once
insulated from losses individuals have less incentive to avoid them.  But there are ways to
combat moral hazard.
First, when investment levels are observable, as they are in the present setting, moral
hazard might be avoided entirely by making insurance premiums a function of the investment
level.  Individuals can invest more on flood plains, but they must pay for the greater expected
losses covered by insurance up front, through higher premiums.  In this manner, they can obtain
complete insurance without there being any adverse incentive effect.
31
Second, when observing investment or other behavior is not possible (and when other
strategies fail
32), a compromise will usually be optimal, one that involves partial coverage.  The
greater the coverage, the greater the incentive problem but the less risk is borne.  Generally, the
optimum will involve a compromise in such circumstances.  (The reason this is so is that risk-
bearing costs are declining at the margin as coverage increases, whereas incentive costs will tend
to be increasing at the margin.)
Might government disaster relief be efficient, or perhaps neutral, when individuals are
risk averse?  In this basic case, no.  First, any relief offered by the government could be provided
by the market.  If it is not, under the present assumptions that will be because such relief is
inefficient, taking into account both risk and incentive considerations.
Second, government relief tends to interfere with the efficiency of private risk mitigation. 
When investment levels are observable, private insurance permits full risk mitigation at no cost
in terms of incentives.  But if some or all losses are covered by government relief, individuals
will invest excessively in high-risk areas.33For further discussion of this issue, see subsection 6.
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Furthermore, even when individuals must bear some risk because insurance cannot fully
combat moral hazard, government relief will be inefficient.  The reason is that, to the extent of
government relief, individuals (and their insurers) will simply ignore the portion of losses that is
to be compensated.  This will lead to excessive investment and also, in the aggregate,
overinsurance.
To see this, suppose that it would be optimal for individuals to have obtained coverage
for 50% of losses, this representing the point of the optimal risk-incentive tradeoff.  Suppose
further that the government were to compensate 50% of losses.  This might seem to have the
same effect as private insurance in the same amount, but this is not the case.  Under such a
regime of government compensation, individuals will be induced to purchase supplemental
private insurance.  This will, just as with pure private insurance, result in further inefficient
overinvestment.  The difference, however, is that as investment increases in the government
compensation regime, 50% of any additional losses in the event of a flood are borne by the
government, not by the insurer (who in turn would have charged the individual for this
incremental cost through higher premiums).  Because this portion of the loss is an externality as
far as the individual and insurer are concerned, it will be ignored in fashioning their private
arrangements.
This point, it should be clear, is general: As long as the government provides for
compensation of any portion of losses, that portion is no longer a cost to private actors and hence
will be ignored, resulting in overinvestment.
3.  Application of analysis to transition mitigation. – Because government-created risk is
analogous in relevant respects to market and natural risks and because government mitigation of
gains and losses is inefficient with regard to the latter, it follows that it must be inefficient with
regard to the former.  Indeed, the same analysis is applicable.  The only subtlety concerns the
understanding of the nature of the adverse incentive effect in various transition settings.
33
Consider, for example, a government decision to tax, limit the use of, or ban a product
because it is learned that the product is harmful.  The prospect of such reform will, in the
absence of relief, discourage investment in producing the product; the greater the probability that
the product will turn out to be harmful, the greater the resulting disincentive.  It should be
apparent that this incentive effect is desirable: It is a consequence of actors bearing the full costs
and benefits of their actions.  Likewise, to the extent that relief for transition losses is
anticipated, actors ex ante will not expect to bear all of their losses and hence will invest
excessively, just like prospective investors in regions prone to flooding.  Furthermore, the
analysis of risk, insurance, and so forth is essentially the same as in the previous case.
Consider another example: government takings, in particular, the prospect that land will34The first significant publication analyzing the incentive issue in the takings context is
Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984), which largely ignores considerations of risk.  (Adverse
incentive effects of compensation were previously recognized by Baxter and Altree (1972) in a
related context.)  Contemporaneously, Blume and Rubinfeld (1984) present a favorable view of
compensation for takings because of risk considerations, downplaying the incentives issue. 
Neither article attempts to synthesize these opposing points in a single, comprehensive analysis. 
More broadly, this shortcoming illustrates the need to offer an integrated analysis of risk and
incentives rather than examining each in isolation.
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be taken for a highway, requiring the leveling of any buildings thereon.
34  Again, the greater the
probability that a highway will be built, the more likely that any building will, from that point
forward, prove to be worthless.  The prospect of compensation will lead to excessive
construction on such sites.  And so forth.
Indeed, similar incentive effects can be identified with regard to a wide range of
government reforms.  Reducing trade barriers or deregulation may reduce the value of inefficient
production facilities that become exposed to competition.  Or shifts in government spending
priorities, away from programs or technologies that are no longer the most effective, will reduce
returns to investments that are less in demand.  In all of these cases, however, the changes
indicate a real reduction in the value of such investments, so it would be optimal for the
possibility of reform to be taken into account ex ante.  To the extent that transition relief is
expected to be provided, this will not occur.  In each instance, to be sure, the possibility of
reform that is unaccompanied by relief will impose risk, but the analysis of the general
superiority of market risk mitigation remains applicable.
In sum, just as in the case of market and natural risks, the prospect of government
transition mitigation creates an externality in private actors’ decisionmaking that would not
otherwise exist.  This suggests that, with regard to the efficiency of private actors’ behavior, no
relief tends to be optimal, and considerations of risk bearing do not upset this conclusion in the
setting under consideration.
4.  Mitigation of gains. – Similarly, if one instead considered an example involving gains
– so-called “windfalls” – the effect of government mitigation, now taxation, would be to induce
inefficiently low investment.  Because a portion of the upside of any investment would be
absorbed by the government, while leaving the individual to bear the full up-front cost of the
investment, too little investment will occur.  Likewise, private arrangements would produce an
optimal risk-incentive tradeoff, as long as no government mitigation was expected to be
forthcoming.
To illustrate, suppose that a new subsidy is enacted for a particular field of research
deemed to be more important in light of heightened terrorist threats.  Mitigation might involve
taxing away the benefits of such a subsidy to those already engaged in the research or using
grandfathering to limit the benefits of the subsidy to new ventures.  It should be recognized,
however, that such mitigation of gains has adverse ex ante incentive effects.  In essence, such an35See Kaplow (1986, section II.C.1; 1987, section 3.2).
36The analysis in the text does not assume that the actor has full knowledge ex ante that
the product is hazardous.  Even if the actor knows that its product is hazardous with a probability
– which may be the best estimate then available – full retroactivity will tend to produce the
correct incentive: The greater the probability that the product is harmful, the less of it will be
produced.  Furthermore, the anticipation of retroactive application would also provide proper
incentives to inquire further into the likelihood that the product is dangerous and into ways to
mitigate the harm if the product turns out to be unsafe.
- 16 -
approach takes away some of the upside return to valuable research in precisely the states of the
world in which it proves to be most valuable.  By contrast, if such new subsidies were to be
made broadly available, the anticipation of such a transition policy would lead to more of such
research ex ante, thus efficiently promoting the purpose of the new subsidy policy.  (Consider a
firm deciding whether to invest heavily ex ante.  It will reason that if the terrorist threat
increases, it will benefit significantly such as through government rewards, but that if on account
of its foresight it will not receive such benefits, their being focused on those who are induced to
increase investment after the fact, the firm will not be as inclined to make significant investments
ex ante.)
5.  The possible need for retroactive application.
35 – Sometimes efficiency in the present
setting requires not only that no government mitigation be provided but also that a reform be
made explicitly retroactive.  Consider again the example involving the decision to tax, limit, or
ban a product that turns out to be hazardous.  If the hazard has always been present – just
previously unknown to the government regulator due to its inevitably incomplete information –
it would have been optimal for production to be even lower ex ante, reflecting the harm caused
throughout the life of the product.  A general policy of full retroactive application in such
contexts – for example, imposing legal liability or a retroactive tax applicable to harm caused
prior to the reform – would accomplish this because the anticipation of such a transition rule
would lead producers to take into account the full harm that their products may cause. 
Nominally prospective application, by contrast, induces them to consider only harm that occurs
after the government discovers and acts on a problem.
36
In this setting, it is necessary to distinguish reform motivated by new information about
existing conditions, as in the foregoing example, from reform motivated by changed
circumstances.  For example, if the harm is not to health but rather that a product causes
electronic interference with a new technology, then full retroactive application would not create
the appropriate ex ante incentives; rather, the anticipation of such a transition policy would
excessively discourage investment, which in this case does not cause any harm prior to the
emergence of the new technology.  If the harm will occur only in the future, a product ban that
takes effect when the harm will begin to occur, for instance, is sufficient to alleviate any
problem.37In prior writing, I noted this point briefly, see Kaplow (1986, p. 556 n.134), and in
hindsight without sufficient emphasis or elaboration.
38Accordingly, the view that requiring transition relief cannot impede efficient reform
because the government should be willing to make the reform even if it must compensate losers
in some manner – see, for example, Ramseyer and Nakazato (1989, p. 1169) – misses the point. 
As explained earlier in section A, it is the anticipation of such relief that causes the distortion,
and the distortion in question concerns ex ante investment.  This distortion arises when transition
mitigation is anticipated even if the provision of such relief is not expected to have any effect on
what reforms are ultimately adopted.
39See the discussion of revenue effects in note 7.
40See, for example, Graetz (1977, pp. 68-73), Logue (1996, pp. 1138-43), Ramseyer and
Nakazato (1989, p. 1167).
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6.  Comment on incentive effects, with special reference to tax reform.
37 – The analysis of
transition policy is often elusive because the efficiency consequences of incentive effects are
often subtle and sometimes nonexistent.  When a reform involves banning a dangerous product,
taxing sources of pollution, and the like, the social benefit from anticipatory incentives
(assuming the reform is a good one) is tangible and clear.  For some policy changes, including
many reforms of details of the tax system, the efficiency consequences may be less apparent. 
Thus, if depreciation schedules are modified or accounting rules jiggled, it may not be obvious –
in terms of consequences in the real economy – why such change is desirable (if indeed it is).
Usually, one can make analogies to corrective (Pigouvian) taxes and subsidies: Activities
should be penalized or rewarded depending on the existence of divergences between social and
private costs and benefits.  Likewise, reforms may be due to new information about activities,
changes in circumstances, or a recognition that previous analysis was mistaken.  Thus, repeal of
a tax subsidy may reflect a new understanding about the merits of the subsidized activity or
about how the existing subsidy operates (perhaps the fact that it was a de facto subsidy was not
appreciated).  For example, when it makes sense to repeal a tax subsidy, the efficiency gain
arises from the real benefits of the shift in investment, and the benefits of not providing
transition relief are due to less distortion prior to the reform, to the extent that the reform and
lack of relief in the event of reform are anticipated.
38  Importantly, the efficiency gain is not due
to the fact that more revenue might be collected in the absence of transition relief.
39
Relatedly, one cannot compare transition regimes using revenue costs as the metric.  It is
sometimes suggested that, if the target is taken to be achieving a given level of incentive effect
over a pertinent time period, the revenue cost will be no lower if subsidy repeals are not
accompanied by transition relief because higher up-front subsidy levels will be required
instead.
40  But this assumes that the efficiency question is concerned with revenue cost and that
the resulting effect on behavior is given and implicitly irrelevant to the social calculus.  Such an
approach is incorrect.  Rather, the efficiency effect concerns precisely the level of the pertinent
behavior.  Furthermore, it is incorrect (really, internally inconsistent) to assume that the correct
level of activity into the future is given and known ex ante and, in particular, is unaffected by the
prospect of subsequent reform that itself is motivated by the discovery of new information that41For further discussion, see Kaplow (1986, subsections II.B.2-II.B.4; 1987, sections 4.1-
4.5).
42Keep in mind that this section V assumes the optimality of underlying government
behavior and its being unaffected by transition policy.  As I emphasized in my prior work, for
example, Kaplow (1986, p. 534), an important exception to the presumption of similarity of
market and government risks concerns issues of government behavior, considered here in section
VI.
43The famous and now-familiar analogy involves the used car market (the “market for
lemons”) analyzed by Akerlof (1970).
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indicates the error in prior understanding of the situation.  (For some further elaboration, see
subsection C.3, on grandfathering implicit in program design.)
B.  Additional Market Imperfections
41
Moral hazard, forming the core of the incentives analysis in section A, is often the most
important market imperfection with regard to mitigating risk, and as the foregoing discussion
suggests government mitigation rather than curing the problem only makes matters worse.  This
section considers some additional market imperfections, ones that may sometimes warrant
government action, but not necessarily in the form of traditional transition mitigation.  In
addition, it should be kept in mind that, in principle, each of the imperfections considered may
be applicable to market and natural risks as well as to government risks; hence, if there is a basis
for government mitigation, it will a priori exist for all types of risks (though context-specific
factors could make the case for government mitigation stronger or weaker in one or another
particular setting).
42
1.  Adverse selection.  – Adverse selection may arise when two conditions are
simultaneously present.  First, potential insured parties must have different probabilities of
suffering harm (or, with gains, receiving benefits).  Second, these differences must be known to
individuals but unobservable to insurers (or other financiers who may be involved in the
diversification of risk).  In such cases, at a given premium, insurance will tend to be most
attractive to higher-risk individuals.  Because insurers cannot observe who in fact poses a higher
risk, they cannot charge differential premiums.  Hence, they must simply assume that they are
attracting only higher-risk individuals and accordingly charge higher premiums.  But at higher
premiums, the pool who choose to insure will further narrow, leaving only those with the highest
of risks.  And so forth.  The result is that many may find insurance unattractive – even though at
actuarially fair rates some coverage would be efficient – and it is possible for insurance markets
to unravel altogether.
43
Adverse selection is unlikely to be important in most transition settings because neither
of the two necessary conditions holds.  First, because government policies tend to be uniformly
applicable, it is unlikely that different actors will have different probabilities of being subject to
a reform.  Second, even when such differences do exist – perhaps a reform will be limited to a
particular industry – it seems unlikely that this would be both known to the private actors and44It is possible that some firms might secretly find out about impending government
action before such news becomes public, upon which they would attempt to take out large
insurance policies.  In settings where this is likely, one might expect there to be delays in
coverage taking effect or a temporary reluctance of insurers to offer new policies.
45In the present example involving hazardous products, the moral hazard that would arise
may well be too great in most settings to justify substantial protection.  Note also that adverse
selection involving government transitions is no different in terms of the optimality of
government relief than adverse selection in other contexts.  Thus, government relief – essentially
a form of compulsory insurance, but without premiums paid by insureds (which, as explained
earlier, can be important with regard to incentives) – is likely to be efficient if but only if more
general government finance and insurance of various market actors tends to be efficient.
46See, for example, Kunreuther et al. (1978).
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unknown to the insurers and other financiers who specialize in dealing with actors in that
industry.
44
In some cases, however, adverse selection may be important.  For example, regarding the
regulation of hazardous products, firms will tend to know more about hidden dangers of their
own, perhaps unique products than insurers.  (Of course, firms are often widely held, reducing or
eliminating the need for insurance.)  When adverse selection is important, compulsory insurance
and related policies may be efficient.
45
2.  Administrative costs. – Different forms of risk mitigation may involve different
administrative costs for a variety of reasons.  Some systematic differences among classes of
mechanisms should be noted.  First, most private mechanisms, like insurance, are arranged ex
ante, while most forms of government relief are applied ex post.  Especially for reforms having a
low ex ante probability, this favors government relief because administrative costs need only be
incurred in the event that a reform actually occurs.  Two countervailing factors are that ex ante
provision can be wholesale – for example, wide ownership simultaneously diversifies all sources
of risk, and a single insurance policy can cover losses from many sources – and that it may
reduce dispute resolution costs, by agreeing on the amount of or formula for compensation in
advance.
Another set of differences arises among government transition mechanisms.  Notably,
taxation and compensation require individualized assessments of gains and losses whereas
grandfathering and delayed or partial implementation do not, although the latter may involve
complexities of their own in determining eligible assets or dealing with multiple rules for longer
periods of time.
3.  Imperfect information by private actors. – Private actors may be uninformed about or
misperceive the probability of various risks.  For example, there is evidence that individuals
underestimate the likelihood of serious floods, leading to overinvestment and underinsurance.
46 
This problem would seem to be more important for individuals than firms and for those relying
on insurance rather than broad ownership to mitigate risk.  Government mitigation may less47For more detailed analysis of the similarities and differences among transition
mechanisms, see Kaplow (1986, section IV.A; 1987, section 3.1).   For further discussion of
alternative transition mechanisms, with an emphasis on the tax context, see Shaviro (2000, ch.
11) and, on the relevance of adjustment costs, see Zodrow (1985).
48See also subsection B.2 on administrative cost differences.
49As Graetz (1977, pp. 60-63) and others have noted, grandfathering can provide more
than complete relief; that is, a transition loss might actually become a gain under full
grandfathering.  The reason is due to scarcity effects.  For example, if a product ban were
implemented but applicable only to new manufacturers, existing manufacturers might gain from
being protected against additional competition.
- 20 -
distort incentives in such cases and provide valuable protection against risk.  However, in such
cases compulsory insurance has an advantage on incentive grounds: For example, forcing
individuals to purchase properly priced flood insurance will avoid overinvestment despite
probability misperceptions because the risk of loss will be reflected in insurance premiums,
which themselves will be a function of individuals’ investment decisions.
C.  Different Forms of Transition Mitigation
47
The foregoing discussion focused on compensation and taxation as means of mitigating
transition losses and gains.  Other important mechanisms are grandfathering (exempting pre-
enactment investments from reforms) and partial or delayed implementation, phase-ins being a
combination of these latter approaches.  Although different techniques are more commonly used
in some contexts than others and some commentators seem to favor or oppose certain methods as
a matter of principle, there is an important commonality among all these approaches, as
explained in subsection 1.  Subsection 2 identifies the most important differences, which derive
from incentive effects.
48  Subsections 3 and 4 consider two important variations.
1.  Similarities. – For any given reform and investment, each transition mechanism will
give some level of relief.  For example, grandfathering may provide full relief,
49 and delayed
implementation of five years may provide significant partial relief (the extent depending on the
remaining life of the pre-enactment investment).  Whatever the level of relief, however, one can
consider an equivalent degree of compensation of losses and taxation of gains.  As a first
approximation, the effects with regard to both incentives and risk bearing should be the same.
2.  Differences. – Nevertheless, there are important differences among the mechanisms. 
Compensation and taxation provide relief, but it is confined to pre-enactment investment and
furthermore the relief is monetary rather than in-kind.  Both of these features can be
advantageous.  Consider, for example, a ban of a hazardous product.  Though compensation has
adverse effects on ex ante incentives as explored in section A, at least upon enactment the
product will no longer be produced by old producers or new ones.
Grandfathering, by contrast, would allow old producers to continue production.  Delayed
and partial implementation both allow adverse effects of pre-enactment investment to continue –50This escape can be especially large if, for example, the delay applies not just to old
investments (actually, a combination of delay and grandfathering) but also to post-enactment
investments because the latter may accelerate to qualify for more favorable pre-reform treatment
(especially if pre-effective-date investment is itself to be grandfathered rather than subject to the
new regime once the effective date passes).
51See Zodrow (1981).  To elaborate, the optimal level of a reform (say, the optimal extent
of a tax or subsidy on an activity) will ordinarily be at the point where marginal benefits equal
marginal costs.  If marginal benefits are falling and marginal costs rising (in the opposite case,
one would certainly not be at the optimum), then the marginal net benefits of the reform are
falling in the relevant range, reaching zero at the optimum.  Partial immediate implementation,
say at a level of 90%, would not reduce the net benefits by 10% but rather by a smaller, possibly
very small, amount (because marginal net benefits are so small near the optimum).  By contrast,
a delay sufficient to provide 10% protection for pre-enactment investors would, roughly, scale
back the total costs and benefits, and hence the total net benefit, by 10%.
52See Kaplow (1986, section IV.A.2.b; 1987, section 5.3).  See also the discussion in
subsection A.6.
53Another way that grandfathering implicit in program design can be made equivalent to
no grandfathering would be for the amount of the up-front subsidy – now assumed not to be
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for a period of time or to some degree – and also provide some escape for new investment as
well.
50  Thus, for a given level of relief, delayed and partial implementation are worse than
grandfathering, which in turn is worse than compensation in such cases.  As between delayed
and partial implementation giving similar amounts of relief, partial (immediate) implementation
will often be preferable because many reforms may be subject to diminishing returns.
51  The
desirability of phase-ins, a combination of delayed and partial implementation, falls in between.
Outside the takings context, compensation (and taxation of gains) is rarely employed. 
Grandfathering (sometimes partial, such as when it lasts only for a period of time or fails to
provide complete exemption), delayed and partial implementation, and phase-ins are common. 
This suggests that when transition mitigation is optimal – or when it will be employed despite its
inefficiency, due to political forces – there may remain significant opportunities for improvement
by selecting forms of mitigation that provide equivalent protection in a less inefficient manner.
3.  Variation: grandfathering implicit in program design.
52 – It is possible to embed
transition mitigation, notably, a form of grandfathering, in program design.  Suppose, for
example, that a subsidy of $100 per year is under consideration for certain investments that have
a life of 10 years.  Grandfathering in the event of repeal would involve continuing to provide the
subsidy for preexisting investment.  Instead, however, the entire subsidy could have been
provided up-front; perhaps an initial subsidy of $800 (with no subsequent payments) would have
a present value equivalent to being entitled to $100 per year for 10 years.  With the up-front
subsidy, no explicit grandfathering would be required in the event of repeal.  If one instead
wished to achieve a result equivalent to immediate, full implementation of repeal without any
grandfathering, it would be necessary to tax back an amount equal to the present value of $100
per year for the remaining years of any particular investment.
53  Under present assumptions,taxed back – to be reduced in magnitude so that it equaled not the present value of the subsidy
continuing for the life of the investment but instead the present value of the subsidy discounted
for the probability and timing of repeal under the annual subsidy version.  (Such a subsidy, to
have the stated effect, may have to be modified regularly as the probability and expected time to
reform changed.)
54See Kaplow (1991b, 1992b).
55Private relief, notably, through charitable organizations, is often limited, implicitly or
explicitly, to uninsured losses and thus has similar effects to this form of government relief.
56Similar inefficiencies can arise in more subtle ways.  For example, if transition relief is
more likely if losses will be incurred by ordinary individuals rather than by widely held
corporations, there is an incentive for assets subject to transition risk to be held by individuals,
who are more risk averse.  See Kaplow (1986, p. 597).
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where transition policies are anticipated ex ante and consistently implemented ex post, it does
not matter which approach is employed as long as they are done equivalently and properly.
The ability to incorporate transition mitigation in program design raises the question of
how one can tell when this occurs.  That is, how does one distinguish an initial subsidy of $800
that is really an implicit grandfathering of a $100 per year subsidy from a simple subsidy of
$800?  The answer is to be found in the purpose of the program, which is to say the reason for
creating the incentive.  A government believing that a type of investment generates a positive
externality of $100 per year would wish in principle to provide a $100 per year subsidy.  In this
manner, the subsidy would be contingent on the investment continuing to exist.  Such a subsidy
would be repealed if, say, due to changed circumstances, the positive externality no longer
existed.  By contrast, suppose that the positive externality were due to the very act of creating the
asset and that this externality was $800.  Then an up-front subsidy of $800 would be appropriate.
4.  Variation: relief limited to uninsured losses.
54 – Some forms of government
mitigation, typically for disasters rather than for government action, provide relief that is limited
to uninsured losses.
55  Examples include some specific assistance programs – a notable example
being the government compensation fund for families with relatives who died as a result of the
September 11 terrorist acts – as well as provisions of the income tax under which uninsured
losses from a variety of casualties are deductible, thus providing relief proportional to one’s
marginal tax rate.
This form of relief, which appears to be designed to mitigate risk, can have the opposite
effect if it is anticipated ex ante.  Specifically, private insurance is discouraged.  For example, if
an actor anticipates that 50% of uninsured losses will be compensated, then for every additional
dollar of insurance coverage that he purchases, he will have to pay a premium reflecting the full
expected cost of such coverage, but he will simultaneously be forfeiting 50% coverage of that
dollar loss, which would have been available for free.  In essence, the individual is paying full
price at the margin for half protection (since the other half of losses is already covered).
56  This
effect – inducing inefficiently low aggregate mitigation of risk – is the opposite of the result with
ordinary transition relief, which as explained tends to result in excessive mitigation of risk.  In57See note 19.
58This point has also been emphasized in some subsequent work on transition policy, see,
for example, Ramseyer and Nakazato (1989) and Shaviro (2000, ch. 4), and has been a theme in
much (but not all) of the literature on compensation for takings.  See sources cited in note 94.
59Government behavior regarding transition policy itself is addressed in subsection
IV.A.1.
60Going further, one could undertake a positive analysis attempting to explain what
transition policies will in fact be employed in contrast to the present article which is concerned
with the normative assessment of transition policy.
61Seminal modern works include Downs (1957), Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Olson
(1965), and Niskanen (1971).  More recent works are Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock (1980),
Ordeshook (1986), Mueller (1989, 1997), and Alt and Shepsle (1990).
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the absence of offsetting market imperfections, both deviations tend to be inefficient.
VI.  Government Behavior
As highlighted in the introduction and in my prior work on the subject,
57 the analysis of
government behavior – the optimality of underlying substantive policies and reforms and how
they may be influenced by transition policy – is of central importance in the assessment of
transition policy.
58  Because the subject of government behavior is so vast and complex (and,
quite frankly, because it is not an area I have studied in depth), the remarks in this section will
largely be suggestive.  Hopefully, they will help clarify some of the relevant questions and lines
of analysis and also indicate a number of useful avenues for further research.
A.  Optimality of Government Policy: Overview
1.  Analysis of government behavior.
59 – In the foregoing discussion, it was largely
assumed that the government behaves optimally, in terms of maximizing social welfare, and
furthermore is not influenced in its underlying policy choices by the transition policy that is in
force.  In a complete analysis, one would relax these assumptions and consider when government
policy is indeed optimal, how in particular it deviates from optimality when it is not, and how in
turn transition policy would affect the choice of underlying substantive policies.  Also relevant
would be the rent-seeking costs involved in the political process and how these costs may be
influenced by transition policy.
60  Such is the subject of an entire discipline, political science (or,
as some prefer, political economy or public choice), and is obviously beyond the scope of this
investigation.
61
A more complete analysis of government behavior might well be expected to generate
different conclusions in different settings, which in turn suggests an important set of reasons that
optimal transition policies may vary by context.  Taxation, tort law, and tariffs, not to mention
countless other areas of law and regulation that raise transition issues, may differ along a number
of important dimensions that are relevant to a political analysis: type of government actor
(legislature, agency, or court), level of government (local, state, federal, or international62Takings offers a stark example.  If a building will be destroyed to build a highway, its
value is lost (and to precisely the same extent) regardless of whether the highway should have
been built.
63Some of the effects would be desirable, others undesirable, with the net favoring the
former.  Taking the argument to the limit, if on average reforms were a matter of indifference –
whether random or the result of political forces that have random effects on the public good –
then whether or not transition policy enhanced the effectiveness of reforms or inhibited them
would make little direct difference.  Such a view is suggested by Ramseyer and Nakazato (1989)
with regard to tax reforms (though they further argue in favor of transition relief due to the belief
that it tends to reduce rent seeking, on which see subsection B.6 and note 86).
- 24 -
negotiation), concentration of gains and losses, level of organization of private actors, and so
forth.  In section B, the analysis will usually be crude (often of a “black-box” sort) and the
illustrations merely suggestive; no attempt is made to get to the bottom of these matters in any
particular situation, much less in general.
2.  Applicability of analysis of private actors when government policy is not optimal. –
Although in section V it was assumed that underlying government policy was optimal, much of
the analysis is relevant even when it is not.  Certainly the positive analysis of how private actors
would behave and of the risk they would bear is largely independent of whether the government
reforms they predict or are subject to are welfare maximizing.
The main point at which the optimality of government policy is relevant involves
assessment of the efficiency of ex ante incentive effects.  For example, failure to provide relief to
manufacturers when their product is banned will discourage production of the product ex ante. 
This effect is desirable if the product is banned when in fact it is found to be dangerous.  But if it
is a beneficial product that will be banned, the reduction in ex ante production is
counterproductive.
Two reservations should be noted.  First, to an extent discouraging ex ante investment
may still be advantageous.  If, once the product is banned, certain capital will become less
valuable, it is better that less of it be created ex ante regardless of whether the decision to ban the
product is a good one.  (That there will be less of the product produced ex ante would, as noted,
be undesirable.)
62  Furthermore, a policy can be inefficient in ways that are largely unrelated to
the desirability of ex ante incentive effects.  For example, a new regulation may be clumsy in
terms of administrability or impose excessive costs (such as when particular technologies are
mandated rather then providing incentives that induce private actors to minimize costs), yet the
problem being regulated may be real.
Second, even if government often makes mistakes, it may nevertheless be true that it is
right more often than not.  In such cases, the efficiency consequences of ex ante effects on
investment will, on average, be as stated, although to a lesser degree.
63  Of course, it may be best
to have a transition policy implied by the analysis in section V when reforms are desirable but to
have transition policies that maximally undermine reforms (for example, infinitely delayed64See Kaplow (1986, section III.A; 1987, sections 4.7 & 4.8; 2000, section 13).
65On bilateral torts, see Brown (1973) and Shavell (1987).  For application to transitions
generally, see Kaplow (1986, 569 n.174; 1987, subsection 4.7.1), and to takings in particular, see
Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984) and Miceli and Segerson (1996, pp. 54-55).
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implementation) when they are undesirable.  However, it seems farfetched to suppose that such a
transition policy would be feasible.  If government could be counted on to make the correct
determination about desirability of reform and also to act on it in setting transition policy, one
might expect it to be able to make the right reform decision in the first place.
B.  Effects of Transition Policy on Government Behavior
64
This section briefly considers some ways that transition policy may affect underlying
government behavior.  When transition policy has such effects, different transition policies may
be optimal than otherwise, but in considering the optimal transition policy it should be kept in
mind, as just noted, that some of the analysis in section V of private actors’ incentives and risk-
bearing may remain applicable.
1.  Bilateral torts analogy.
65 – Bilateral torts involve potential accident situations where
the behavior of both injurer and victim affect the probability of loss.  Strict liability provides the
injurer with proper incentives (the prospect of harm is fully internalized) but the victim with
none (since it does not bear any loss).  No liability provides the victim with proper incentives (it
bears the full loss) but the injurer with none.  One might allow a defense to strict liability of
contributory negligence (to preserve victims’ incentives) or utilize a negligence rule (which
gives the injurer an incentive that, if successful, leaves victims bearing losses, giving them an
incentive as well).  Both compromises require a determination of the optimality of at least one
party’s behavior – victims in the case of contributory negligence and injurers in the case of
negligence – which is both costly and subject to error.
The analogy is that full compensation (like strict liability) destroys private actors’
(victims’) incentives whereas no compensation, while preserving private actors’ incentives,
leaves the government (injurer) with no financial incentive.  As with tort liability, one could
consider compromises.  Victims’ compensation could be conditioned on the optimality of their
ex ante investment decisions, which it would seem would be most difficult to determine.  Or the
government’s obligation to pay compensation could be dependent on the suboptimality of its
behavior.  When the government’s behavior is assumed to be optimal, as in section V, then only
victims’ behavior needs to be controlled and a regime of no compensation tends to be efficient. 
Alternatively, one could attempt to motivate a regime of no compensation on the view that,
whatever means exist to determine the optimality of government behavior, they are employed in
policymaking itself; put another way, if there were a means of identifying suboptimal
government policy, it would seem better to use the information directly to modify government
policy rather than to leave bad policy in place and use the information as the basis for awarding66An important caveat, related to the analysis in the next subsection, is that if the prospect
of compensation would itself induce better government behavior, then using the information to
determine compensation may have the same effect as using it directly to correct policy errors.
67This point is also emphasized by Fischel and Sykes (1999) in their consideration of
whether the government should be held to the same contract rules as private parties.
68See most of the references cited in note 94.
69See, for example, Quinn and Trebilcock (1982, p. 135).  Consistent application of the
logic behind the fiscal illusion argument would seem to favor not only requiring compensation
but also taxation of all benefits from government activity.  Compare Bell and Parchomovsky’s
(2001b) discussion of takings and “givings.”  Note that if the extent of losses and benefits could
reliably be assessed, such information could be used to determine the correct government policy,
dispensing with the payment of compensation and collection of taxes, which has the advantage
of saving administrative costs and of avoiding adverse incentive effects on private behavior. 
Note further, however, that systems of compensation and taxation will motivate parties to
provide information – that is to litigate – about the true extent of costs and benefits, although that
itself a costly process.  See Kaplow (1987, section 4.7.1).




The benefit of this analogy is that it highlights the problem of government behavior and,
in particular, suggests that it may be responsive to incentives, notably, to those that may be
provided by transition relief.  The difficulty is that the analogy on the government side is highly
imperfect because analysis of government behavior differs from that of private behavior (even if
ultimately it is rooted in similar first principles).
67  Many differences will emerge in the
subsequent discussion, most directly in the next subsection.
2.  Fiscal illusion. – The fiscal illusion argument, most often advanced in the takings
context,
68 is closely related to the foregoing torts analogy (though it is not usually cast in those
terms).  The claim is that, because the government does not actually bear the cost of its actions, it
will be prone to excessive takings; requiring compensation internalizes this cost, thus correcting
the problem.
On its face, this argument is incomplete, for the government ordinarily does not actually
receive the benefits of its actions either.  Hence, in the absence of a compensation requirement, it
is not obvious whether the government will give too little or too much relative weight to costs. 
Likewise, a requirement of compensation results in the government bearing all the costs and
none of the benefits, which might on this view be expected to lead to decisions heavily skewed
toward inactivity.
69
To advance the analysis, a more nuanced account of government behavior is required. 
Under one view, costs or benefits will be given greater weight if they are more concentrated
because those who bear them will better be able to overcome the free-rider problem that impedes
political mobilization.
70  Since in the takings context it is costs that are usually more71This point illustrates the argument in subsection 5 on the use of transition relief
enhancing the feasibility of reform by buying off opposition.  Empirical evidence on the actual
effects of compensation is limited.  Cordes and Weisbrod (1979) find that federal highway
funding tended to shift toward states with lower compensation requirements, supporting the view
that requiring compensation reduces activity, albeit in a context where the contrary political
considerations seem less applicable.
72See, for example, Niskanen (1971).
73This problem, that a majority each member of which benefits slightly outvotes a
minority each member of which suffers greatly, is in a sense opposite to the aforementioned
point that concentrated losses may be overweighted in the political process because such losers
are better able to organize than a large number of individuals each of whom benefits little. 
Which phenomenon is more important obviously depends on the political context; each outcome
may sometimes occur in different domains.
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concentrated, this view suggests that costs will be given too much weight, not too little.  Indeed,
a compensation requirement might result in more takings because, once compensation is
required, costs are dispersed broadly among taxpayers so political opposition might be
diffused.
71
Under another view, government entities’ power, prestige, and ability to benefit from
perquisites is positively related to the size of their budget.
72  Hence, an agency that had to
provide compensation might gain thereby, and once compensation was required, it would have
perhaps a greater incentive to increase the scope of its activities.  On the other hand, the
enhanced visibility of its actions and political difficulties in competing for funding might reduce
its activity.
Yet another set of possibilities is that government actors may benefit from greater
activity per se or that, due to weak incentives for performance, they may be too inertial.  In the
former case, a compensation requirement may provide a useful corrective, whereas in the latter
case it may exacerbate the problem.
Clearly, the simple fiscal illusion argument is inadequate.  Determining whether
requiring compensation, taxation of gains, and other forms of transition relief will increase or
reduce the extent of certain types of policies, and assessing the social desirability of any such
effects on government policymaking, requires more explicit theoretical and empirical analysis of
the pertinent government actors.  Moreover, once the question of the quality of government
decisionmaking is explicitly presented, analysis of how to improve it should not be confined to
transition mitigation.
3.  Tyranny of the majority; abuse of power – Democratic systems do not necessarily
produce socially desirable outcomes.  Indeed, there are systematic reasons to be concerned about
abuse.  One problem is simply that, in the absence of constraints, a majority may benefit itself at
the expense of a minority, even when the costs to the latter exceed the benefits to the former.
73 
Likewise, both legislatures and government officials can abuse their power by singling out74Such considerations in part motivate Epstein’s (1985) views on takings, compensation,
and redistribution.
75Consider, for example, the limited effectiveness of the equal protection clause with
respect to economic regulation (that is, outside areas in which heightened scrutiny is applied).
76Epstein (1985) is favorably disposed toward such an outcome, though truly binding
prohibitions on any even incidental redistribution would tend to make even limited government
infeasible.  Much of the argument about takings doctrine and about limited government is
concerned with making workable distinctions in this realm.  The controversy concerns not only
how to draw lines but which activities of government are permissible in principle.
77Levmore (1993) thereby presents a more favorable view than is conventional toward
retroactive taxation.
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particular individuals or groups (despised minorities, political opponents, those unwilling to pay
for protection) for adverse treatment or by bestowing government largesse on a select few.
Transition mitigation – such as proscriptions of retroactive legislation, requirements of
compensation – can in some cases help to alleviate such problems.
74  There are, however, limits
on what can be accomplished because it is necessary to devise ways (constitutional requirements,
strong social norms) to ensure that protective transition rules can be enforced in such
circumstances.  Furthermore, it seems difficult to tailor these mechanisms to the particular
problem.  If the protections are reasonably narrow, there may be many ways to circumvent
them.
75  A physical taking may give rise to a right to compensation, but a similar extraction
through various regulations may not.  On the other hand, if protections are sufficiently broad so
as to make essentially impossible any sort of redistribution, virtually all government policy may
be thwarted, including both policies aimed at improving efficiency and those designed to
accomplish what many may view as legitimate distributive objectives.
76
Given the importance of this problem, it should hardly be ruled out a priori that some
transition rules may have a useful role to play.  Furthermore, as a historical matter, constitutional
restrictions on ex post facto legislation and bills of attainder and the takings clause may best be
explained by the sorts of concerns considered here.
4.  Expropriation; capital levies. – A particular type of government abuse involves
expropriation, which is all the more worrisome because of its enticing features.  A familiar
lesson of public economics is that a one-time capital levy – in which the entire capital stock is
taken by the government, accompanied by a promise never to do it again – is an efficient tax. 
Substantial revenue is raised, largely from the rich, and no future distortion, notably, of savings
and investment decisions, occurs if the promise is believed.  Moreover, as long as the
expropriation is not anticipated, there are no adverse ex ante incentive effects.  Consequently,
such taxation – and likewise retroactive taxation more generally (on a one-time, never-again
basis) – at first seems appealing.
77
The difficulty with the argument is obvious.  As has long been recognized, a government
that behaves this way may not be trusted in the future, with serious adverse effects on78Compare the discussion in subsection IV.A.1 of the difficulty of the government
announcing one transition policy and following another.
79A complete analysis is more involved because redistributive taxation generally has the
character that ex ante incentive effects are undesirable.  Notably, a labor income tax (or a
consumption tax) inefficiently distorts the labor-leisure choice.  Here, the relevant analysis
seems to be whether a redistributive tax is desirable even taking ex ante incentive effects into
account.  A government acts consistently and thus may maintain credibility if it limits itself to
taxes that meet such a criterion.  Some important possible tax reforms (including the enactment
of new taxes) do raise important questions involving expropriation.  See, for example, the
discussion of the transition from an income tax to a consumption tax in section VII.D (and of
other tax transitions in note 101) and the discussion of accounting changes in subsection IV.B.2.
80See, for example, Tullock (1978) and Usher (1995).  For further exploration between
compensation and the prospects of legal change, see Levmore (1999).
81Individuals whose losses were covered by insurance would be less inclined to resist
reforms causing the losses.  On the other hand, their insurers would now have an incentive to
lobby.  Moreover, insurers, by aggregating claims, may have more concentrated interests and
thus be more effective.  In addition, insurance companies may often work together and are
organized as a group for other purposes.  On the other hand, insurance companies may
sometimes be less effective lobbyists, in part because they may generate less sympathy than
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incentives.
78  Consider the example of governments in developing countries that are thought to
pose expropriation risks, whether for foreign investors, who are led to avoid the country, or for
domestic wealthholders, who attempt to transfer assets abroad.  Successful governments need to
find ways – whether through constitutional constraints or established norms – of committing
themselves not to engage in such behavior.  Indeed, one suspects that there is a broad
understanding that any government that engages in such activity will not be trusted again any
time soon, such that the future cost from lack of investment exceeds the (possibly substantial)
short-run gain from a capital levy.
For such restraints to succeed, however, it is necessary that expropriation be
distinguishable from ordinary government policy reform, which often creates some losers.  An
important difference is that, as suggested by the analysis in section V, the anticipation of reform
– and its concomitant incentive effects – is ordinarily desirable, whereas with a capital levy
anticipation would be undesirable.
79  Thus, for example, an anticipated policy of the government
seizing assets that are dangerous or are used to commit crimes will discourage acquisition of
such assets, which would be desirable, whereas an anticipated policy of seizing all capital would
discourage productivity generally.
5.  Political feasibility – Transition relief is sometimes favored because it reduces
opposition to desirable reforms.
80  For example, those who have paid dearly for valuable licenses
in industries with restricted entry (often on the secondary market, as with taxi owners and
broadcasters) may strongly resist efficient deregulation, but compensation may reduce or
eliminate their resistence.  (Observe that private insurance may also produce a similar effect,
although the analysis is more complex.
81)would their insureds if personally bearing the losses and in part because of jurisdictional
differences (for example, homeowners who oppose a zoning ordinance that would reduce their
property values may be politically effective at the local level of government, whereas an out-of-
jurisdiction insurance company owned by numerous anonymous investors may have less clout).
82For concerns about the related process of logrolling, see, for example, Buchanan and
Tullock (1962) and Mueller (1979).
83See, for example, Kitch (1977), Quinn and Trebilcock (1982), and McKenzie (1986).
84See Doernberg and McChesney (1987).
85Epstein’s (1985) argument favoring restrictive takings law is interpreted by Merrill
(1986) as grounded in significant part on the fact that such a regime, with its requirement of
compensation, will reduce rent seeking.  See the related discussion of tyranny of the majority in
subsection 3 and also subsections 2 and 5 on how providing compensation may make
government activity easier by diffusing political opposition.
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In addition to distorting private actors’ ex ante investment decisions, this approach has
two problems.  First, why should it be assumed that relief will buy off opposition to desirable
reforms rather than opposition to undesirable reforms?  There is some basis for a positive view:
Desirable reforms will have benefits in excess of their costs; if all losers were compensated and
individuals still favored the reform, it will tend to be a desirable one.  With an undesirable
reform, whose costs exceeded its benefits, it would not be possible thus to compensate fully all
losers.  The concern, however, is that only politically influential losers – of both good and bad
reforms – would actually be compensated in the political process.
82  Again, a more complete
analysis is required.  Essentially, the present discussion indicates that political side payments,
however provided, should be viewed as forms of transition relief, suggesting that many of the
other issues raised here would be relevant.
Second, there are ex ante political incentives to consider.  Special interests already have
excessive incentives to lobby for favorable treatment.  If the norm is that, if and when such
benefits are repealed, the special interests will be compensated or otherwise protected, then their
initial incentive to lobby for such policies will be increased.
83  It is not obvious that the net effect
of buying off opposition ex post, when one includes effects of undesirable policies ex ante and
wasteful rent-seeking expenditures, would be positive.
6.  Rent seeking – The prospect of reform may be accompanied by rent-seeking behavior,
such as when private interests expend resources lobbying.
84  The most important consideration
with regard to such behavior is how it affects the quality of the resulting legal regime, a subject
identified in subsection A.1, further analysis of which is beyond the scope of this article.
Nevertheless, it is worth considering quite briefly how transition policy may affect
overall expenditures on rent-seeking activity, a lesser but not unimportant concern.  Ramseyer
and Nakazato (1989) argue that guaranteeing transition relief in advance will reduce rent-seeking
activity regarding repeals, although this very fact will make legislatures disinclined to promise
such protection.
85  As suggested in subsection 5, however, promises of protection ex post make
special interest legislation more attractive ex ante, which will increase rent-seeking activity86 Ramseyer and Nakazato (1989, p. 1173) acknowledge this phenomenon but dismiss it
because the degree of ex ante benefit to be enacted is taken as given in their discussion.  Yet in
an analysis in which all subsequent legislation is assumed to be an endogenous product of
lobbying, it is inconsistent to ignore lobbying at the outset on the ground that the legislature
implicitly will act identically regardless of what lobbying occurs.  For skepticism about
Ramseyer and Nakazato’s claim, see Fischel and Sykes (1999, pp. 378-79).
87See, for example, Ramseyer and Nakazato (1989, p. 1172 n.48).
88Consider, on one hand, alternating every year between two policies and, on the other
hand, always being subject to the average (in some sense) of the two policies.  The latter will
probably involve reduced transaction and administrative costs and also tend to discourage
moving economic activity across years for the purposes of taking advantage of whichever regime
is more desirable.
When a polity is rather evenly divided – which is when frequent fluctuations in ruling
parties are most likely to occur – a number of factors tend to produce moderation, including each
party’s’ ever-present incentive to appeal to the median voter and, relatedly, parties’ desires to
maintain a ruling majority and succeed at reelection.
89Other means, such as undertaking durable public investment projects or engaging in
long-term contracting, tend to have a similar effect.  See Glazer (1989), Laffont and Tirole




A further point about any link between transition policy and rent seeking is that
legislatures can always use substitute means to extract rents from an interest group.
87  For
example, if the legislature was constrained from repealing a specific tax break for the oil industry
– which it might like to threaten to do in order to extract rents from industry lobbyists – it could
always instead threaten to impose some other new tax adjustment or regulation having a similar
effect.
In sum, how various transition policies would affect the extent of rent seeking (and, more
importantly, its effects on policy implementation) is a complex question deserving of further
study.
7.  Binding future regimes. – Transition policy also affects the ability of a given
government to bind future regimes.  If current enactments can simply be repealed by a
subsequent government regime, policy may tend to fluctuate more rapidly, which will have some
undesirable consequences independent of which policies actually are best.
88  But if current
enactments are costly to repeal or their effects cannot fully be reversed because of a requirement
of transition relief (for example, a norm of compensation or grandfathering), then a given regime
can project its policies into the future, after they have been rejected by the electorate.
89
Moreover, there may be ex ante incentives to design policies that increase lock-in effects. 
This will, however, tend to be true whatever is the transition policy, although it would seem
more difficult to lock policies in when transition mitigation requirements are lower.  (See also90For some further discussion of this complex issue, see Kaplow (1986, subsection
III.A.5; 1987, subsections 4.7.3 & 5.3).
91The discussion in subsections IV.B.1 of incidental versus intentional redistribution and
in IV.B.3 of rules that regulate behavior versus default rules reinforces the claim that a common
conceptual framework, once clearly understood, can help to resolve some difficult issues and
may readily lead to quite different results in different settings.
92See, for example, Kaplow (1986, subsection IV.C.1; 1987, section 5.1).
93In addition, the analysis in section V.C of the differences among transition mechanisms
is applicable: All mechanisms except compensation of losses and taxation of gains may permit
continued inefficiency regarding pre-enactment investment, and delayed, partial, and phased-in
implementation may sacrifice benefits regarding post-enactment behavior.
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the discussion in subsection V.C.3 on grandfathering implicit in program design and in section
VII.E on government contracting.)
90
VII.  Applications
It is helpful briefly to consider some applications to make the analysis concrete.  Also, by
considering a range of contexts, one can see both how the same analytical framework is of quite
general use and how it nevertheless may lead to different conclusions in different contexts.
91  An
important caveat, though obvious, is worth emphasizing: None of the discussions that follow
purport to be comprehensive; not even close.  In particular, the analysis of government behavior
will often be highly incomplete.
A.  Regulation of Newly Discovered Externalities
92
Regulation of newly discovered externalities, such as by banning products or production
processes, using corrective (Pigouvian) taxes and subsidies, or applying (extending) common
law doctrines, tends to be desirable not only ex post but also with regard to its ex ante effects. 
As discussed in section V, the anticipation of transition losses in the case of negative
externalities will efficiently discourage (and of transition gains in the case of positive
externalities will efficiently encourage) investment ex ante.  Furthermore, as explained in
subsection V.A.5, when the externality is preexisting (rather than due to changes in conditions
that have given rise to an externality not previously present), retroactive application tends to be
the efficient transition policy because the anticipation thereof will efficiently further affect
production during the relevant period of time.
93  Such transition policies also impose risk, but
market mitigation tends to be best (transition risk not being significantly different from market
and natural risks in relevant respects); furthermore, that most firms are widely owned is
important to recognize.
Regarding government behavior, the relevant actor might be a legislature, an agency, or a
court; obviously, different analyses may be appropriate in each case, both of the quality of
policymaking regarding externalities and of whether different transition policies are likely to
affect such policymaking, for better or worse.  How such analysis would bear on the94See, for example, Bell and Parchomovsky (2001a, 2001b), Blume and Rubinfeld
(1984), Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984), Epstein (1985), Farber (1992), Fischel (1995),
Fischel and Shapiro (1989), Hermalin (1995), Kaplow (1986, subsection IV.C.2; Kaplow 1987,
section 5.2), Miceli and Segerson (1996), Michelman (1967).
95The analysis differs when private investments enhance the public use, such as when
land is taken to further species preservation.  Then, private actors need to be induced ex ante to
maintain such investments rather than to reduce them (for example, by clear-cutting a forest, the
public use value may be destroyed, which benefits the private actor if this reduces the likelihood
of a taking that will not be fully compensated).  See, for example, Innes (2000).
96Because losers will often be individuals, who may, for example, misperceive risk, the
analysis is not straightforward, although the prior framework (see especially section V.B)
indicates how such complications should be taken into account.
97As further explained in section V.B, when imperfections (other than moral hazard)
interfere with market risk mitigation, compulsory insurance may nevertheless be superior to
compensation or other government mitigation on incentive grounds, but may be worse with
regard to administrative costs.
98Although beyond the scope of the present article, the framework offered here also helps
to illuminate when the government should acquire property by takings and when it should
engage in ordinary purchases.  See Kaplow (1986, pp. 529-30 n.54, 605-06 n.300; 1987, p. 189
n.160).
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applicability of the foregoing treatment of private actors’ incentives would depend in part on the
nature of the reform.  For example, if production is disallowed or sufficiently discouraged with
the result that industry-specific assets lose value, the prospect of this loss should ideally be taken
into account ex ante even if the policy causing the loss is mistaken.  But the efficiency of other
incentive effects may well depend on whether the underlying government policy is correct.
B.  Takings
94
Takings were often used in section V to illustrate the analysis of private actors and in
section VI on government behavior.  When takings result in the destruction of existing assets,
such as when a building is leveled to construct a highway,
95 it is optimal for investors to take
such losses into account regardless of whether the taking is desirable.
96  This transition policy
does result in private actors bearing risk, but market risk mitigation tends to be more efficient
than compensation (although various imperfections noted in section V.B might qualify this
conclusion).
97  On the other hand, retroactive application would ordinarily be unnecessary
because takings of this sort, even when optimally chosen, do not indicate that ex ante
investments were undesirable per se.
98
A number of (conflicting) views regarding the effect of a compensation requirement on
government behavior were offered.  Much further analysis and empirical study is necessary to
resolve the issue.  It should be noted, however, that concerns for abuse of power do seem
stronger than average in some classic takings contexts, in which an individual’s or a small
group’s assets are singled out by the government, and this problem may explain the existence of99See, for example, Kaplow (1986, p. 606; 1987, p. 192).
100See, for example, Kaplow (1993) and also Kolbe, Tye, and Myers (1993) and Quinn
and Trebilcock (1982) on regulatory risk more generally.
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constitutional protections against uncompensated takings.  In sum, as I emphasized when first
writing on the subject,
99 the resolution of many of the relevant arguments is quite uncertain and
some point in conflicting directions, so no simple conclusion may be offered.
C.  Electric Utility Deregulation
100
Electric utility deregulation might in some cases be expected to result in large gains
(when price ceilings are lifted) and in others to cause large losses (when inefficient sources of
production are no longer protected against competition from lower-cost power generators). 
Much of the analysis in sections V and VI seems applicable.  For example, utilities that do not
expect transition mitigation – either taxation of gains or compensation for losses – would be
more strongly encouraged ex ante to construct and maintain efficient sources of electricity but
not costly ones.  The ex ante incentive effect is likely to be particularly important in such a
setting because deregulation has been a serious prospect for an extended period of time.  The
problem is complicated, however, by the fact that there is no clear ex ante understanding of what
sort of transition mitigation might accompany deregulation
A significant complication in this setting involves the fact that private actors, here,
electric utilities, are heavily regulated and thus not free ex ante to make their own decisions.  For
example, they may have been led to construct inefficient capacity by regulators.  Of course, if it
is anticipated that, if deregulation occurs, the utility will have to bear large losses, it would more
strongly oppose such construction ex ante and regulators may find it more difficult to induce
inefficient behavior.  Whether this is the case depends on the power and behavior of the
regulators, which requires further study.
Other important private actors are not so regulated.  Notably, consumers (who make
long-run investments regarding energy usage) and suppliers (particularly fuel companies)
undertake ex ante behavior that may be affected by anticipated transition policy because it may
be implemented through mechanisms (for example, energy taxes and subsidies) that influence
the prices they would expect to pay or receive.  This is another instance in which direct
mitigation – such as through compensation for losses or taxation of gains, which has more of a
lump-sum character and hence does not directly affect future behavior – may be more efficient
than other forms of mitigation (holding the extent of mitigation constant).101Early treatments (which do not rely on the qualitatively different ex ante incentive
effects of accounting changes versus other changes) include Bradford and U.S. Treasury (1984,
ch. 6) and Graetz (1977, pp. 50-52; 1979, pp. 1649-51, 1653-58).  The present discussion follows
Kaplow (1986, subsection IV.C.3.b; 1987, subsection 5.4.1; 1995a).  See also Bradford (1996),
Sarkar and Zodrow (1993), and Shaviro (2000, ch. 9).  It should also be noted that similar
analysis is applicable to a pure change in tax rates, especially rates on capital.  Indeed, the
transition from an income tax to a consumption tax is much like the introduction of a
consumption tax or a rate increase on a consumption with regard to the treatment of pre-
enactment savings, operating much like a partial capital levy.  See also Kaplow (1987, section
5.4.2) regarding the need to change tax rates as revenue needs vary over time, the benefits of
smoothing tax rates over time, and how transition mitigation relates thereto.
Another important tax transition – noted in Kaplow (1987, p. 201 n.172) – that has
received some attention involves corporate income tax integration, the central issue being
whether old equity should be permitted to gain or should be exempt from the benefits of such
reform.  See, for example, American Law Institute (1989, 1993), U.S. Treasury (1992), and
Shaviro (2000, ch. 8).  See also the discussion of the proposed recapture of benefits from
accelerated depreciation in connection 1986 Tax Reform Act’s reduction of the corporate tax
rate in Kaplow (1987, subsection 5.4.2).
102For simplicity, the treatment of interest will be ignored.  The treatment of interest is at
the heart of the difference between an income tax and a consumption tax over the long run, but it
is not central to the transition phenomenon considered in the text.
103Likewise, a gain is conferred on individuals who borrow pre-enactment in the absence
of mitigation because borrowed principal is not taxable under an income tax but repayment of
principal is deductible under a consumption tax; the ex ante disincentive to save discussed below
is thus accompanied by a parallel ex ante incentive to borrow.  See Kaplow (1995a, p. 1118),
suggesting that transition treatment of basis should be provided for net basis, which is to say
basis in pre-enactment assets net of pre-enactment liabilities.
104Some simulations of transitions to a consumption tax find large efficiency gains, much
of which can be attributable to this capital levy effect.  This is why transitions to a wage tax tend
to show substantially lower levels of welfare than transitions to a consumption tax, even though
the two taxes are equivalent in the long run.  See, for example, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987,
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D.  Transition from an Income Tax to a Consumption Tax
101
The transition from an income tax to a consumption tax presents an important illustration
of accounting changes, addressed in subsection IV.B.2.  Consider a dollar earned in the final
period subject to an income tax, which the earner chooses to save.  It will be taxed when earned,
for that is what an income tax does.  Suppose further that, in the first period under the
consumption tax, this individual spends the dollar.  This act will also result in full taxation, for a
consumption tax applies to all expenditures, including those from savings.
102  Indeed, this sort of
transition, in the absence of any relief, involves a significant capital levy of the sort discussed in
subsection VI.B.4.
103  (Here, the expropriation is not complete.  But if the tax rate is, say, 30%, a
very substantial portion of the capital stock will in essence have been taken by the
government.
104)ch. 5) and the discussion in Sarkar and Zodrow (1993).
105Indeed, that a transition to a consumption tax without relief involves a heavy tax on
savings is antithetical to consumption tax proponents’ belief that a major benefit of a
consumption tax is that it, unlike an income tax, does not disadvantage savings.
106See, for example, Bradford (1996).
107The present discussion follows Kaplow (1986, pp. 529-30 n.54, 541-42 n.90, 564, 587;
1987, sections 5.3 & 5.4.2; 2000, section 13).  See also Fischel and Sykes (1999).  In addition,
there is an economic literature on government procurement that has some relevance.  See, for
example, Laffont and Tirole (1993).
108Another sort of complication arises from government regulation, such as when civil
service rules protect government employees’ jobs.
109And, as should be clear from the discussion to follow, the question of the government’s
choice of contract duration similarly warrants examination.  On these and related questions, see,
for example, Fischel and Sykes (1999) (noting that contract doctrine for the U.S. government
differs from that for private contracts, suggesting that some of these special legal doctrines serve
a useful function by limiting the ability of government to shield agreements due to rent seeking
from subsequent attack), Laffont and Tirole (1993, ch. 16) (on whether the government’s ability
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But it is not the purpose of moving to a consumption tax to expropriate a significant
fraction of capital.  Furthermore, if such a transition, without relief, is anticipated, one would
expect substantial ex ante avoidance activity, notably dissaving and attempts to transfer capital
outside the jurisdiction.
105  As discussed in subsection IV.B.2, accounting adjustments seem
appropriate in such cases.  Here, one might exempt withdrawals of pre-enactment savings from
consumption taxation or offer a similar level of relief in other forms.  (The transition to a
consumption tax also raises a number of other complex transition issues that are not considered
here.
106)
E.  Government Contracting
107
Government contracting – a widespread activity ranging from the procurement of
paperclips to the hiring of millions of workers and the commissioning of jet fighters, space
probes, and elaborate highway projects – is related to the transition problem in a number of
ways.  First, many of the issues considered here could be applied to government contracting per
se.  Governments adopting new policies, such as new spending priorities, will change their
contractual practices.  Often this is simple: If fewer paperclips are needed under the new regime,
fewer will be ordered.  But this can be more complex, such as when the government has entered
into a long-term contract to produce jet fighters but later decides to reduce defense
expenditures.
108
A number of observations are in order.  One is that the government makes a choice, ex
ante, whether to buy products on the spot market (probably the norm for paperclips) or enter into
contracts of varying durations.  Another is that most governments voluntarily subject themselves
to ordinary contract liability.  Hence, when they breach (say, due to a change in priorities), they
pay damages.  Whether this approach makes sense is a matter deserving analysis.
109  Paymentsto bind future governments through long-term contracts is desirable), and Wickelgren (2001)
(discussing how traditional contract damage remedies increase the incentive of incumbent
governments to structure contracts to bind future governments).  Also, compare the discussion in
subsection VI.B.7 on how transition policy may affect the ability of a government to bind future
regimes.
110See, for example, Shavell (1980) and Rogerson (1984).
111The analysis, of course, depends on which government actors are involved.  It may be
that some institutions, such as a legislature, an agency, or a court, would establish certain
reputations regarding their future behavior, but that others may have greater difficulty doing so
or convincing particular private actors that they are reliable.  Accordingly, some government
actors may find it advantageous to act through law and rely on their reputations regarding when
and how reforms will be made and others may be better off entering into binding contracts.
112See, for example, Logue (1996, pp. 1143-49, 1183-86) and Ramseyer and Nakazato
(1989, pp. 1166-71).
113Indeed, this point is reflected in Supreme Court contract clause doctrine.  See, for
example, National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atcheson, T. & S.F. Ry., 470 U.S. 451, 465-66
(1985) (quoting Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 79 (1937)) (“[A]bsent some clear
indication that the legislature intends to bind itself contractually, the presumption is that ‘a law is
not intended to create private contractual or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be
pursued until the legislature shall ordain otherwise.’ . . . Policies, unlike contracts, are inherently
subject to revision and repeal. . . .”).
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for breach (in all contract settings) may induce excessive reliance.
110  On the other hand, they
provide good incentives regarding breach and the absence of such payments may result in
inefficiently little reliance investment.  Of course, ordinary economic analysis of contracts
considers private actors.  When the government is a party, the question of how it behaves in
general and how this behavior is affected by the prospect of having to pay damages is
complicated, as discussed in section VI.
111
Second, running the analysis in the opposite direction, many have suggested that
government policy generally should be analogized to contracts, in which case any reform can be
seen as a contract breach.
112  There are a number of problems with this notion.  Initially, as noted,
it is not obvious that ordinary contract analysis is fully applicable when the government is a
contracting party.  Furthermore, legislation, regulation, and other government lawmaking is in
important respects different from contracts precisely in that legal regimes explicitly contemplate
change.
113
Additionally, and relatedly, the government can be seen as making a choice when it
decides to enact a law or regulation rather than enter into a contract.  For example, it could
choose to enact a subsidy of $100 per year for a long-lived type of investment; such a subsidy,
by its nature, might at some point be repealed.  (Historically, most subsidies have ultimately
been repealed or amended or expanded, often numerous times.)  Or it could announce its
willingness to enter into a contract with all comers (or some subset, just as eligibility for a
subsidy might be limited by statute or regulation), under which it would bind itself to pay $100114See note 111 suggesting one of the possible benefits of allowing different government
actors to choose differently.
115Even long-term contracts, such as for a new type of fighter aircraft, may involve a
prototype or a limited order, with subsequent, larger orders possibly being placed in the future,
depending on the success of the contractor and the level of later defense needs.
116Furthermore, when explicit long-term contracts are made, an effective contracting
agency will take into account the possibility that its needs may differ in the future and, even if
the contract is not made freely terminable, it may scale down its demands accordingly.  Compare
the discussion in note 53 of adjusting the level of a subsidy when it is implicitly grandfathered
by making it fully payable up front.
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per year for a fixed term of years or for the life of the investment.
Much could be said about which approach makes more sense in a given instance, as
suggested in part by the analysis in subsection V.C.3 of grandfathering implicit in program
design.  An important point to observe is that most legal regimes offer government actors a
choice, one that can be exercised differently depending on the circumstances.
114  If, instead, one
insisted that all government policy be treated identically, as constituting a binding contract
subject to certain contract rules, this flexibility would be lost.
Such a loss, however, may be meaningless, for statues, regulations, or court decisions
could be made expressly conditional on future enactments; common boilerplate could be added
in every instance, or a legislature or agency might simply enact an umbrella rule governing all of
its other enactments.  Indeed, one could characterize the status quo in such a manner.  Another
way to put the point is to view legislation and regulation as analogous to short-term or at-will
contracts or to contracts that contain a termination provision that is invoked by government
action following its ordinary lawmaking procedures.  (In fact, a substantial portion of
government contracting involves spot purchases or short-term agreements.
115)
Thus, for purposes of making an analogy between legal change and contracts, repeal can
just as easily be understood as legitimate termination of one of the aforementioned contracts as it
can be compared to a breach of a long-term contract that did not permit termination before the
end of the term except upon payment of damages.  That is, nothing in the contract analogy itself
tells us what sort of contract – of what duration and with what provisions for termination, breach,
and remedies – should be the subject of the analogy.  To assume, perhaps implicitly, that the
relevant analogy is to a long-term contract is to beg the question.
116
VIII.  Conclusion
The study of transition policy is receiving increasing attention from scholars in many
fields of law, particularly takings and taxation.  Given the ubiquity of the problem and
commonalities across areas of application, even further attention – and cross-fertilization – is
warranted.- 39 -
The existing literature, however, in addition to emphasizing some legal subjects more
than others, has been skewed in a number of respects.  One is that far more attention has been
given to transition losses than to transition gains despite the symmetry of the two phenomena. 
Another is that the analysis of private actors with regard to incentives and risk bearing is
substantially more developed than is the analysis of government behavior, including how such
behavior is affected by transition policy.  In this instance, a good deal of attention has been
devoted to the latter category of behavior, but the problem is more complex and most analysis –
including by this author – has been fairly black box and has not taken full advantage of recent
decades of work by political scientists and other pertinent scholars.  Also, there is a greater need
for clear statements of the objective of transition policy (welfare is favored herein) and tracing
effects directly; heavy use of proxies and intuitions is often problematic, and this is especially so
with regard to transition policy, which involves a meta-question of sorts.
Finally, as emphasized in the introduction, it is important to make explicit and consistent
assumptions when analyzing transition questions, especially regarding government behavior with
regard to transition policy (including private actors’ expectations thereof) and underlying
substantive policy.  It is often challenging enough to assess the welfare effects of various
government reforms, such as in the area of tax policy.  It is even more difficult to examine what
policy should be toward future changes and, in particular, how the process of change itself
should be addressed with regard to what is, at that moment, past behavior.  As a first step,
analysis must be clear and internally coherent.  Ultimately, assumptions will hopefully become
more realistic.  Further questions regarding implementation of transition policy must also be
addressed.  Taken together, such research should enhance the understanding of existing
government transition policy and hopefully allow for its improvement.- 40 -
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